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IMPROVING THE METHODOLOGY FOR THE INTEGRAL ASSESSMENT OF REGIONAL TAX RISK FROM THE SHADOW ECONOMY TO INCREASE LOCAL BUDGET REVENUES

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ABSTRACT

This article develops an integral regional tax risk indicator designed to identify the fiscal reserves that can be mobilized from shadow economic activity for the benefit of local budgets in Uzbekistan. The proposed methodology combines local budget revenue performance, cash and cashless turnover patterns, tax discipline, payment-system formalization, and control results into a single normalized and policy-operational index that is suitable for territorial differentiation. Its practical value lies in linking risk scoring not only to enforcement intensity, but also to preventive measures, digital formalization, and quarterly local budget planning.

Keywords: local budgets, shadow economy, regional tax risk, tax administration, fiscal reserves, digital payments, cashless transactions, territorial differentiation, integral indicator, Uzbekistan.

INTRODUCTION

The stability of local budgets increasingly depends on the quality of territorial tax administration rather than on nominal tax rates alone. In economies where a significant part of value creation remains partially hidden, the local fiscal base becomes fragmented, volatile, and difficult to forecast. This problem is especially visible in trade, services, small business turnover, and household-based market activity, where legal activity and undeclared circulation often coexist within the same territorial space. When such duality persists, local governments face a paradoxical situation: formal tax revenues grow more slowly than actual local economic activity, while expenditure obligations continue to expand. For this reason, the methodological question is no longer whether the shadow economy affects local budget revenues, but how territorial tax risk can be measured in a way that is operationally useful for real administrative action. In Uzbekistan, this challenge has moved from a general policy concern to a central fiscal issue because the national development agenda now links shadow-economy reduction directly with local fiscal sustainability, digital formalization, and balanced territorial growth [1].

A further complexity arises from the fact that shadow activity is territorially uneven and institutionally heterogeneous. Two regions may report similar nominal tax revenues while having fundamentally different structures of cash circulation, payment formalization, taxpayer discipline, and audit outcomes. Under such conditions, uniform control approaches generate either over-inspection of relatively compliant territories or under-detection in zones where hidden turnover is more concentrated. International and comparative research shows that the shadow economy weakens tax revenues, distorts the mix between direct and indirect taxation, and shifts the burden onto more visible taxpayers, especially where institutional capacity is uneven [12]. For tax administrations, risk management therefore becomes a strategic method of selecting the right territorial response, because it helps direct limited resources toward the most material forms of non-compliance while preserving voluntary compliance among law-abiding taxpayers [11]. A regional integral indicator is useful precisely because it translates diffuse administrative signals into one comparable metric that can guide prioritization, prevention, and fiscal planning.

This study seeks to design such an indicator for the Uzbek setting and to demonstrate its methodological relevance for local budget policy. The article relies on recent open data for 2021–2025, including payment-system dynamics, cash circulation patterns, local budget parameters, and newly adopted legal provisions governing formalization, digital payments, and revenue forecasting. Its central contribution is not merely descriptive; rather, it proposes a structured model that aggregates fiscal performance, payment behavior, tax discipline, and control outcomes into a normalized regional tax risk score. Unlike narrow audit-based approaches, the proposed methodology is intended to estimate the size of mobilizable fiscal reserves hidden behind territorial asymmetries in cash intensity, weak payment traceability, or repeated compliance failures. The article therefore combines institutional analysis, comparative interpretation of administrative data, and an applied scoring framework that can be used by tax authorities, finance departments, and local executive bodies. In that sense, the research addresses both an academic gap and a practical management need by offering a territorial measurement tool tailored to the current stage of Uzbekistan's fiscal modernization [9].

MAIN BODY

One should begin with the fiscal logic of local budgets themselves. Local budget revenues are not simply a passive reflection of national tax policy, because they are materially shaped by the extent to which local production, trade, labor, and services become visible to tax administration systems. Whenever commercial turnover is settled in cash without proper recording, or when business activity remains outside stable registration and reporting channels, the fiscal capacity of a territory is understated. That understatement does not only reduce current collections; it also weakens future forecasting, distorts transfer needs, and lowers the credibility of territorial revenue targets. Accordingly, a regional tax risk methodology should be able to estimate not only current compliance failures but also the unrealized fiscal reserve embedded in local economic opacity. This is why the article treats shadow activity as a risk to the mobilization of local revenues, rather than as a purely macroeconomic phenomenon detached from subnational finance.

Another important point concerns transmission channels. The shadow economy reduces local revenue through several interrelated mechanisms: undeclared turnover, fragmented taxpayer registration, misreporting of sales, resistance to payment traceability, and delayed adaptation to digital reporting requirements. In practice, these channels reinforce one another, because high cash intensity often coincides with low invoicing discipline, weak point-of-sale transparency, and poor integration of transaction data into tax analytics. Where local enforcement relies only on ex post inspections, the administration reacts after revenue has already been lost instead of identifying areas where fiscal leakage is structurally likely. The problem therefore is not merely the presence of violations, but the absence of a territorial system that can rank municipalities and regions by the probability and expected fiscal cost of hidden turnover. An integral indicator responds to this problem by translating multiple partial signals into a single territorial risk estimate.

Territorial heterogeneity makes such aggregation indispensable. Industrial centers, border districts, market-intensive urban zones, tourism corridors, and agrarian territories do not produce the same compliance patterns or the same types of hidden turnover. Some areas may formally perform well because a few large taxpayers dominate the revenue base, while smaller business segments remain weakly formalized below the surface. Other territories may show modest aggregate revenue but still possess substantial fiscal reserve because payment-system penetration is low and cash settlements remain dominant in retail and services. If tax administration does not distinguish these structural differences, identical supervisory measures will generate unequal efficiency across regions. The proposed indicator is therefore designed as a comparative territorial instrument, not as a generic national average that obscures the local anatomy of fiscal risk.

The institutional environment of Uzbekistan now provides a concrete reason for moving toward such differentiated measurement. At a presidential meeting on macroeconomic stability and economic development, it was emphasized that shadow-economy reduction had been pursued by multiple agencies in a fragmented way, and that coordination needed to be strengthened through specialized institutional mechanisms [2]. That policy shift matters methodologically because risk assessment becomes more valuable when several agencies produce data that can be combined into one territorial signal. Tax risk is no longer visible only through tax declarations; it also appears in payment-system records, inspection results, digital-service usage, market formalization, and local budget execution. A modern methodology must therefore be integrative by design and should treat regional tax risk as an inter-agency analytical construct. Such an approach also reduces the common administrative mistake of equating high formal collections with low latent risk.

Recent reforms have further increased the analytical importance of digital traces. The 2026 presidential address stated that the share of the unobserved economy had been reduced from 45–50 percent to 28 percent and that a dedicated program aimed to push cashless payments in trade and services above 75 percent while expanding formal-sector employment [1]. For territorial analysis, this is highly significant because a region's fiscal risk can now be inferred from its speed of transition from opaque cash circulation toward traceable digital turnover. When digitalization expands, tax administrations gain better visibility into transaction chains, turnover consistency, and behavioral anomalies. Conversely, when cash intensity remains unusually high relative to local economic structure, the probability of hidden turnover and underreported tax bases rises. Accordingly, any integral indicator that ignores payment behavior would miss one of the most policy-relevant changes in the current fiscal environment.

The legal framework adopted in late 2025 also supports a more precise territorial methodology. Law O'RQ-1108 introduced new rules that strengthen enforcement against non-transparent payment behavior, modify sanction regimes related to cash registers and payment acceptance, and expand procedural mechanisms for targeted tax administration [3]. At the same time, the decision on improving conditions for individual entrepreneurs and self-employed persons introduced a one-percent turnover tax regime for annual turnover up to one billion soums and reinforced the role of special QR codes in the formalization architecture [4]. These changes matter because they reduce the cost of voluntary formalization while simultaneously increasing the detectability of concealed retail and service transactions. As a result, regional tax risk should now be measured not only through punitive outcomes, but also through the share of activity that remains outside the lower-cost legal channels created by the new regime. This combination of simplification and traceability justifies a prevention-oriented indicator rather than an audit-only one.

Methodologically, the proposed integral indicator groups regional risk into several interdependent blocks. The first block captures local budget revenue performance through the execution of revenue plans, growth rates of own revenues, and the gap between estimated economic activity and formal tax mobilization. The second block reflects payment opacity through cash intensity, card cash-out behavior, the share of digital acceptance in trade and services, and the dynamics of QR-linked payments. The third block measures taxpayer discipline through arrears, repeat violations, and the ratio of identified irregularities to the active taxpayer population. The fourth block summarizes control and formalization outcomes, including audit findings, warning-to-correction conversion, and the extent to which digitalized commerce displaces hidden turnover. A territorial score becomes analytically meaningful when these blocks are interpreted together rather than separately, because shadow risk usually manifests as a pattern rather than a single abnormal value.

Each block serves a distinct explanatory function. Local budget indicators show where the visible fiscal outcome is weak, but by themselves they cannot reveal whether the weakness is caused by poor economic structure, temporary seasonality, or concealed activity. Payment indicators, by contrast, show how much of local trade and services are likely to pass through traceable channels, yet they do not independently establish the fiscal magnitude of the reserve. Discipline and control indicators add behavioral evidence by showing whether non-compliance is occasional, persistent, or concentrated in certain territorial segments. When all three dimensions are combined, the administration can distinguish territories with ordinary cyclical variation from territories where weak formalization and repeat irregularities jointly point to a hidden tax base. That is the conceptual advantage of an integral indicator: it reduces false positives and yields more proportionate management responses.

Normalization is required because the component variables are expressed in different units and have different directional meanings. Some indicators increase risk when their value rises, such as cash-out ratios, repeated violations, or audit-confirmed concealment. Others decrease risk when their value rises, such as the share of cashless turnover, the spread of compliant QR-based payments, or the correction of violations after warnings. For that reason, the methodology uses directional min–max normalization, converting every variable into a 0–1 scale and ensuring comparability across territories and time periods. The regional integral tax risk score can therefore be written as $IRTRI_r = \Sigma(w_j \times Z_{jr})$, where w_j denotes the weight of the j-th component and Z_{jr} is the normalized risk contribution of region r for that component. The final score is rescaled to 0–100 points for managerial readability and easier threshold setting.

Weighting should not be arbitrary, because different indicators have different fiscal significance. In the present methodology, larger weights are assigned to variables that directly affect the visibility of turnover and the realizable revenue base, such as local revenue execution gaps, the share of cash in circulation, card cash-out ratios, and audit-confirmed hidden turnover. Moderate weights are assigned to early warning indicators, including repeated payment-acceptance violations, delayed correction after notices, and abnormal divergence between local economic activity and declared turnover. Smaller but still meaningful weights are given to contextual indicators that help refine interpretation, such as seasonality sensitivity or the relative concentration of risks in specific sectors. This hierarchy follows the logic that an effective territorial score should be anchored in observable fiscal consequences while still remaining predictive enough to support prevention. A weighted system is therefore more appropriate than a simple average because it preserves the strategic distinction between material fiscal leakage and secondary diagnostic signals.

Before presenting the structure of the integral indicator, it is necessary to examine how payment and cash-circulation dynamics have changed over the last five years. These dynamics matter because formalization is increasingly mediated by payment behavior rather than by registration status alone. When more turnover passes through cards, terminals, mobile applications, and QR instruments, the administration receives denser transactional data and better opportunities to detect undeclared sales. When, however, the same system continues to show high rates of cash withdrawal from cards or persistent dominance of cash settlements in sectors prone to concealment, regional fiscal risk remains elevated even under nominal digital expansion. The empirical trend from 2021 to 2025 therefore provides an important background for territorial tax-risk measurement. It reveals whether the macro-direction of formalization is strong enough to justify differentiated regional scoring and whether cash-intensive outliers are becoming easier to identify [5].

Recent data from the Central Bank provide precisely this kind of evidence. The 2023 and 2024 annual reports, together with the 2025 cash-circulation review, show a sustained increase in funds

credited to bank cards, a slower increase in cash withdrawals, and a declining share of cash in broad money [6][7][8]. This means that the national payment environment is gradually becoming more transparent, but the pace of transition is uneven across channels and sectors. Such unevenness is exactly what a regional risk framework should capture, because the same macro-trend may conceal local pockets where digital instruments are used only as temporary gateways to subsequent cash withdrawal. In fiscal terms, that pattern is critical: a rise in formal payment inflows does not automatically guarantee a proportional rise in the declared tax base. The table below summarizes the most policy-relevant national signals for 2021–2025 and explains why they matter for territorial tax-risk diagnostics.

Table 1. Dynamics of payment formalization and cash intensity relevant for territorial tax-risk assessment, 2021–2025

Indicator	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Bank cash receipts, trln UZS	251.7	343.9	413.9	501.0	615.0
Bank cash disbursements, trln UZS	255.5	356.4	417.5	510.0	635.0
Funds credited to bank cards, trln UZS	299.6	553.6	789.5	1034.2	1447.9
Cash withdrawn from bank cards, trln UZS	95.0	149.5	189.2	225.9	279.0
Card cash-out ratio, %	31.7	27.0	24.0	21.8	19.3
Share of cash in broad money (M2), %	20.0	22.3	21.5	19.2	18.1
Growth of bank-card inflows, %	—	84.8	42.6	31.0	40.0
Growth of card cash withdrawals, %	—	57.4	26.6	19.4	23.5
Gap between inflow growth and cash-withdrawal growth, p.p.	—	27.4	16.1	11.6	16.5

Source: compiled by the author from Central Bank reviews and annual reports for 2021–2025 [5][6][7][8]. The 2025 value for funds credited to bank cards is an author's estimate derived from the official statement that the amount increased 1.4 times relative to 2024.

Several conclusions follow from these figures. First, the increase in bank-card inflows was consistently faster than the increase in card cash withdrawals, which indicates a gradual strengthening of traceable payment channels. Second, the card cash-out ratio declined from 31.7 percent in 2021 to approximately 19.3 percent in 2025, meaning that a rising share of digital inflows remained within the formal payment ecosystem. Third, the share of cash in broad money fell to 18.1 percent by the beginning of 2026, reinforcing the view that macro-level payment formalization is deepening. For territorial tax-risk analysis, this does not eliminate the shadow economy, but it does improve the statistical conditions for identifying outlier regions that lag behind the national transition. A methodology that compares regional behavior against these nationwide trends will be more informative than one relying only on raw local revenue totals.

Yet national improvement should not be misread as universal territorial formalization. The same data show that cash remains substantial in absolute value, because both bank cash receipts and

bank cash disbursements continued to grow strongly through 2025. This means that the economy is becoming more digitized while simultaneously expanding in scale, so local tax administrations may still confront large cash-intensive segments even under improving national averages. From a risk perspective, the most informative territorial signal is therefore not whether cash exists, but whether cash intensity remains abnormally high relative to local economic structure, payment infrastructure, and formal turnover expectations. A region where card inflows rise rapidly and cash-out ratios fall may deserve a lighter supervisory approach than a region where digital inflows are quickly converted back into cash and point-of-sale compliance remains weak. The integral indicator is intended to identify precisely this divergence between national progress and local asymmetry.

Local budget forecasting reforms strengthen the relevance of such differentiation. The recent budget planning framework introduced digitalized procedures for revenue forecasting and clarified the parameters of local budgets and interbudgetary transfers, including a 2026 local-budget revenue forecast of 76 trillion soums for the aggregate regional level [10]. In methodological terms, this means that territorial tax risk should be embedded directly into revenue planning, because a region's expected fiscal reserve influences not only tax supervision priorities but also the realism of own-revenue projections. An integral risk score can therefore serve as an analytical bridge between tax administration and finance departments by indicating where revenue plans may be conservative, realistic, or vulnerable to hidden-economy leakage. This planning dimension is essential because shadow-economy reduction should not be evaluated only after the budget year closes. A robust methodology should help local authorities anticipate mobilization potential ex ante, quarter by quarter, rather than merely record ex post underperformance.

The next step is to translate these empirical and institutional observations into a structured index. The design proposed here uses nine component dimensions so that the indicator remains broad enough to capture revenue, behavior, and enforcement, yet compact enough to be operational within administrative practice. Each dimension is scored on a normalized scale, assigned a weight according to fiscal materiality, and then aggregated into a final 0–100 territorial risk value. The resulting score is not meant to replace professional judgment; instead, it standardizes the first stage of regional prioritization and creates comparability between territories with different scales of economic activity. In this way, the methodology combines statistical discipline with administrative flexibility. Table 2 summarizes the structure of the proposed integral regional tax risk indicator and the management logic associated with each block.

A carefully designed indicator must also preserve interpretive transparency. Tax authorities and local finance officials should be able to explain why a territory receives a high score and which component variables are driving that result. For that reason, the model avoids overly complex latent-variable techniques that are difficult to operationalize in routine administrative work. Instead, it prioritizes auditable inputs, directional normalization, and weights that can be revised during annual recalibration. Such transparency matters institutionally because risk scoring gains legitimacy when regional administrations understand that the score reflects observable fiscal and behavioral evidence rather than a black-box algorithm. A transparent integral indicator is therefore more likely to be accepted as a common managerial instrument across agencies.

Table 2. Proposed structure of the integral regional tax risk indicator for mobilizing local fiscal reserves

No.	Component	Weight	Direction	Methodological meaning

1	Local budget revenue plan execution gap	0.18	Higher gap = higher risk	Measures whether actual own-revenue mobilization trails the local economic base and plan logic.
2	Growth gap between local GRP proxy and tax revenue	0.14	Higher gap = higher risk	Captures under-taxation relative to economic activity growth.
3	Cash intensity of local turnover	0.12	Higher cash share = higher risk	Uses cash-heavy patterns as a proxy for low traceability in trade and services.
4	Card cash-out ratio	0.12	Higher cash-out = higher risk	Detects whether digital inflows rapidly revert to opaque cash circulation.
5	Share of cashless payments in trade and services	0.10	Lower share = higher risk	Signals the depth of payment formalization in the main hidden-turnover sectors.
6	Repeated payment-discipline violations	0.09	Higher frequency = higher risk	Reflects persistence of non-compliance after initial detection.
7	Audit- or inspection-confirmed hidden turnover	0.11	Higher amount = higher risk	Links direct control results to expected fiscal leakage.
8	Tax arrears and delayed correction after warning	0.08	Higher arrears = higher risk	Connects behavioral inertia to likely future revenue losses.
9	Formalization response to simplified digital regimes	0.06	Lower response = higher risk	Assesses whether preferential legal channels reduce concealment in small business segments.
Total	Composite regional score (0–100)	1.00	—	Weighted sum of normalized components; basis for territorial ranking and management decisions.

Source: author's methodological construction based on the territorial risk-management approach in tax administration, current Uzbek fiscal reforms, and open administrative-payment data [3][4][10][11].

The logic of Table 2 is that a high-risk territory should not be identified by one variable alone. A region may have a moderate revenue execution gap but still deserve priority attention if it combines high cash intensity, persistent card cash-out, repeated payment-discipline violations, and significant audit-confirmed hidden turnover. Conversely, a region with temporary revenue weakness but strong digital formalization and low recurrence of violations may require supportive measures rather than aggressive control. The indicator therefore separates structural hidden-economy risk from ordinary

fiscal fluctuation. This distinction is crucial for avoiding misallocation of supervisory resources and for maintaining proportionality in local tax administration. It also aligns risk analysis with the broader objective of preserving voluntary compliance while concentrating enforcement where expected fiscal returns are highest.

To make the score actionable, threshold bands can be introduced. For example, a score below 35 points may be treated as low risk, 35–55 points as moderate risk, 55–70 points as elevated risk, and above 70 points as high fiscal-risk territory requiring targeted intervention. These bands should trigger differentiated responses rather than a single control script. Low-risk territories may be managed mainly through service support, monitoring, and quarterly diagnostics. Moderate-risk territories may require intensified digital-formalization campaigns and sector-specific notices, while high-risk territories justify combined analytics, field verification, and short-cycle review of local revenue plans. In this way, the indicator becomes not merely descriptive but decisional.

Seasonality must also be incorporated into interpretation. Many local economies exhibit strong quarterly shifts linked to agricultural cycles, tourism flows, holiday demand, market intensity, and periodic salary or pension disbursements, all of which affect cash turnover and apparent compliance behavior. If these effects are ignored, the administration may wrongly classify seasonal spikes in cash demand as evidence of structural concealment. Therefore, each component should be evaluated against a comparable seasonal baseline, preferably using moving quarterly averages or year-on-year territorial comparisons. Such calibration improves the precision of the score and prevents supervisory overreaction in territories where cash fluctuations are normal but temporary. A seasonally adjusted integral indicator is particularly useful for aligning tax-risk analysis with local budget monitoring by quarter.

The methodology is also compatible with the new rules on budget forecasting and territorial fiscal planning. Presidential Decision PQ-397 institutionalized the digitalization of state budget revenue forecasting and expanded the informational base available for subnational planning and interagency coordination [10]. That reform implies that territorial tax-risk scores can be inserted into the forecasting cycle as an explanatory layer, especially for adjusting local own-revenue expectations and identifying mobilizable reserves in vulnerable sectors. If a region’s score worsens while its revenue plan remains unchanged, planners receive an early warning that formal collections may fall short of the territory’s real taxable potential. If the score improves, the same methodology can justify a more ambitious but evidence-based revenue target. Thus, the index can support both prudence and ambition in local fiscal management.

From an implementation standpoint, the model should be updated quarterly but recalibrated annually. Quarterly updates ensure that tax authorities respond to emerging local risks in time, while annual recalibration allows revisions in weights, thresholds, and sectoral parameters as the economy digitalizes further. A pilot phase should begin with a limited number of regions representing different economic structures, such as a large metropolitan area, a market-intensive district, an industrial territory, and an agrarian zone. This would make it possible to compare how the same indicator performs under different revenue structures and hidden-economy channels. Validation should combine statistical checks with expert review by regional tax officials and finance departments, because methodological strength increases when model outputs are tested against field knowledge. Only after such piloting should the model be scaled into a nationwide territorial ranking system.

No methodology is free from limitations, and the present proposal is no exception. Some components depend on data availability and interagency data exchange quality, which may still vary across territories despite rapid digitalization. Certain types of hidden economic activity may also remain only indirectly observable, especially where informal labor, household production, or mixed

legal-illegal trade channels dominate. Nevertheless, the absence of perfect visibility is not a reason to avoid structured measurement; on the contrary, it strengthens the need for a composite risk system that triangulates different administrative signals. Compared with fragmented descriptive monitoring, an integral score offers a far more coherent basis for territorial prioritization. Its greatest value lies in transforming dispersed evidence into a systematic estimate of local fiscal reserve and regional tax risk.

CONCLUSION

The study demonstrates that the reduction of the shadow economy can contribute to local budget growth only when territorial tax risk is measured with sufficient methodological precision. A purely aggregate view of formalization is not enough, because local fiscal losses emerge through uneven combinations of cash intensity, weak payment traceability, repeat non-compliance, and delayed administrative response. The integral regional tax risk indicator proposed in this article addresses that problem by combining fiscal, behavioral, payment, and control variables into one comparable score. Its practical significance lies in the fact that it can be used simultaneously for regional ranking, preventive management, and improvement of local revenue forecasting. In the Uzbek context, where digitalization, simplified tax regimes, and interagency data exchange are developing rapidly, such a methodology can materially improve the identification of mobilizable fiscal reserves.

Four substantive conclusions arise from the analysis. First, the 2021–2025 payment data show a clear expansion of traceable turnover, but local fiscal risk remains meaningful wherever digital inflows are still quickly reconverted into cash or where cash remains dominant in vulnerable sectors. Second, territorial tax risk should be interpreted as a composite phenomenon; no single variable can adequately represent the fiscal consequences of shadow activity at the local level. Third, embedding the indicator into the local budget forecasting cycle would strengthen the realism of own-revenue planning and the targeting of administrative measures. Fourth, the most effective use of the proposed methodology is differential management: low-risk territories require service-oriented support, while high-risk territories require coordinated analytical and control interventions.

POLICY PROPOSALS

1) Introduce the integral regional tax risk indicator as a mandatory quarterly analytical annex to local budget revenue monitoring, so that tax administration and finance departments interpret the same territorial risk map before corrective fiscal decisions are made.

2) Create a unified regional dashboard that merges local budget execution, payment-system data, QR-based formalization signals, and repeated violation records, thereby allowing hidden-turnover risks to be detected before they accumulate into annual revenue gaps.

3) Apply differentiated supervisory regimes by territorial score: low-risk regions should receive service and formalization support, medium-risk regions should receive targeted warning and digital onboarding, and high-risk regions should be subject to intensive analytics and short-cycle field verification.

4) Use the indicator to estimate mobilizable fiscal reserves by sector within each territory, especially retail trade, household services, and market-based commerce, so that local revenue planning moves from descriptive reporting to reserve-oriented fiscal management.

5) Institutionalize annual recalibration of weights and thresholds through joint review by the Tax Committee, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and regional administrations, ensuring that the methodology evolves in line with new payment technologies, simplified tax regimes, and observed compliance behavior.

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